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Abstract
Deep neural networks have achieved impressive
performance and become the de-facto standard in
many tasks. However, troubling phenomena such
as adversarial and fooling examples suggest that the
generalization they make is flawed. I argue that
among the roots of the phenomena are two geo-
metric properties of common deep learning archi-
tectures: their distributed nature and the connect-
edness of their decision regions. As a remedy, I
propose new architectures inspired by fuzzy logic
that combine several alternative design elements.
Through experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10,
the new models are shown to be more local, better
at rejecting noise samples, and more robust against
adversarial examples. Ablation analyses reveal be-
haviors on adversarial examples that cannot be ex-
plained by the linearity hypothesis but are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that logic-inspired traits
create more robust models.
1 Introduction
The success of ReLU-based neural networks in recent years
originates from their learnability and expressiveness. Piece-
wise linearity helps them avoid gradient exploding or vanish-
ing problems of early architectures and, in terms of expres-
sive power, they are shown to be able to capture an exponen-
tial amount of variations [Raghu et al., 2017]. However, little
can be guaranteed about the validity of the learned represen-
tations. Recent work has pointed out two troubling phenom-
ena: adversarial examples [Szegedy et al., 2013] and fool-
ing examples [Nguyen et al., 2015]. In the context of image
recognition, the former are images slightly perturbed to fool a
model while being semantically the same to human eyes. The
latter, fooling examples, are images that do not belong to any
class and yet are classified to one with high confidence. Both
the results of Szegedy et al. [2013] and Nguyen et al. [2015]
demonstrate that a model that is easy to train might also easily
make invalid generalization.
Much research has been devoted to explaining these phe-
nomena [Goodfellow et al., 2015; Ford et al., 2019, among
others]. Recently, Nguyen et al. [2018] identifies the ten-
dency of ReLU networks to create connected classification
regions as one likely source of adversarial examples.
With regards to fooling examples, the networks’ distributed
nature is likely to be among the causes. The activation of a
ReLU unit gets stronger the further the input is from its deci-
sion boundary. Noise patterns are typically far from decision
boundaries and therefore also likely to induce a high level of
activation. A more principled approach would be to make lo-
cal generalizations in which a model makes confident predic-
tions within bounded regions of the input space and gradually
becomes less confident further away. Even though removing
the locality assumption is among motivations to develop deep
architectures [Bengio and Delalleau, 2011], it will be shown
here that we can have one that is both deep and local.
To design a local and disconnected deep neural network,
I take inspiration from fuzzy logic. Image classification can
be cast as learning a system of propositions that take pixel
intensities as input and produce the likelihood of each class
being present. Given the complexity of the task, it is reason-
able to expect those propositions to be expressed in terms of
concepts which, in turn, are expressed by sub-concepts until
we reach the input, for example:
class1 ← concept1 ∨ concept2
class2 ← (concept2 ∧ concept4) ∨ concept3· · ·
conceptn ← (x0,0 ∧ x0,1) ∨ (¬x0,1 ∧ x1,1 ∧ x1,2)
The hierarchical layout and alternating pattern of ANDs
and ORs above are essential for expressiveness because they
compactly express an exponential number of cases. Con-
cepts, as specified by fuzzy propositions, can be local and
disconnected in the sense that they admit a typically small
subset of the input space (e.g. dogs among all visible objects)
and can combine arbitrary subconcepts into one (e.g. to ac-
count for the diverse appearances of birds, from robins to os-
triches to penguins). It will be shown in next sections that it
is possible to incorporate such abilities into a modern neural
network architecture and doing so helps alleviate fooling and
adversarial examples.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: modifications
to a ReLU network is proposed in Section 2; experimental
procedures and results are detailed in Section 3 and 4; I will
situate the research in the wider literature in Section 5 before
concluding with some remarks in Section 6.
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(a) Activation (b) Derivative
Figure 1: Comparing ReLog with two popular activation functions
2 Approximating Propositional Logic in
Neural Networks
The task of emulating logic in a high-dimensional space car-
ries with it inherent difficulty. To balance learnability and ca-
pacity, I start with ReLU-based CNNs and make amendments
where they deviate from the ideals. The results are captured
in this section as a series of re-considerations.
2.1 Rethinking Activation Functions
If we are to think of a neuron as representing a logic formula,
constraints must be placed on its range of activation. Com-
mon sense suggests that a soft logic function ramps up its ac-
tivation as more and more supporting evidence accumulates,
but only to a certain point. In other words, it must exhibit a
saturation region. Sigmoid achieves this by exponential decay
but this has been shown to cause vanishing gradient problem.
To strike a balance between fidelity and learnability, I in-
troduce rectified logarithmic function (Figure 1a):
ReLog(z;β) =
1
β
log (βmax(z, 0) + 1) , (1)
where β > 0.
As can be seen in Figure 1b, in the right half of the func-
tion, the derivative of ReLog peaks higher and stays mean-
ingful for a much larger range compared to sigmoid. Another
important property of ReLog is that it approximates ReLU
when β is close to 0.
2.2 Rethinking Neurons
In the distributed representations framework, the individual
neuron does not carry any particular meaning [Hinton et al.,
1986]. In contrast, a logical view considers the neuron as a
function that returns true for a particular pattern and false for
everything else.
The patterns depicted in each column of Figure 2 can
be captured by logical conjunctions and disjunctions which
translate into min and max in fuzzy logic [Belohlavek and
Klir, 2011]. For this reason, I propose min-max-out units, an
extension of maxout [Goodfellow et al., 2013] in which in-
coming input is first passed through a min operation (repre-
senting AND) and then a max operation (representing OR):
MinMaxOutm,n(x) =
m
max
i=1
n
min
j=1
p∑
k=1
wijkxk (2)
The result is a better fit as illustrated in Figure 2b. How-
ever, because the number of linear units needed to fit a point
(a) ReLU (b) Min-max-out (c) Elliptical kernel +
Max-out
Figure 2: Different types of neurons differ in the ability to fit to the
shape of the data. Blue dots represent data points and shaded regions
are regions in the input space that creates positive activation in the
target neuron.
cloud increases linearly with the number of dimensions, this
solution might not scale to high-dimensional spaces. An al-
ternative is to draw curved boundaries around the data points
by applying the kernel trick:
z =
m∑
i=1
w′ix
2
i +
m∑
i=1
wixi + b, (3)
To create elliptical boundaries, the constraint w′i ≤ 0 ∀i
can be applied. Elliptical units eliminate the need for min-out
but not max-out units as illustrated in Figure 2c.
2.3 Rethinking Regularization
Explicit regularization is a way to reduce overfitting. This is
clear in the textbook case of fitting a polynomial curve where
smaller weights can reign in curvature [Bishop, 2006]. How-
ever, it is not obvious if and how this applies to a ReLU-based
neural network that is linear almost everywhere. The analysis
in the previous section suggests an alternative view on regu-
larization as margin modulation.
The distance between a ReLU unit’s decision boundary and
a training example in Cartesian space is:
d =
|∑mi=1 wixi + b|√∑m
i=1 w
2
i
, (4)
where x ∈ Rm is the input vector, w ∈ Rm and b ∈ R are the
weights and bias of the neuron.
Similar to a support vector machines (SVM), the distance
between the decision boundary and the closest example can
be increased by minimizing ||w|| [Bishop, 2006]. Notice that,
different from SVM, only accepted patterns count because
rejected ones lead to inactivation and zero gradient.
On the other hand, the decision boundary is removed from
the coordinate origin by:
d0 =
|b|√∑m
i=1 w
2
i
. (5)
Noticing that the origin is on the same side as the accepted
input pattern if b > 0 and on the opposite side if b < 0, it can
be easily shown that reducing b reduces the margin around
the accepted pattern. Combining the two observations above
gives us a way to control decision margin that I shall call max-
fit for its ability to increase fitting to an input pattern:
rmax-fit =
γ
m
m∑
i=1
|wi|+ γ′b (6)
where γ, γ′ ∈ R+ govern the strength of regularization and
m is the number of inputs. A similar formula can be defined
for L2 regularization.
2.4 Rethinking Training
The approximation would not be complete without the ability
to reject examples that do not belong to any of the predefined
classes (i.e. to compute a all-zero row in a truth table). To this
end, I replace softmax with independent sigmoid activation
and train directly on negative examples using binary cross-
entropy (BCE) loss. I also experimented with mean square
loss but found that it leads to slower convergence and lower
accuracy. Because techniques to generate fooling examples
are out of the scope of the current paper, I only experimented
with overlaying two images from different classes. The im-
ages can be efficiently generated from training examples as a
data augmentation step.
3 Experimental Design
Experiments were designed to validate the following hy-
potheses about a model that contains some of the proposed
modifications:
H1 (learnability and expressiveness): the model can be
trained to the same accuracy on a clean dataset.
H2 (locality): for natural examples, a class is predicted with
high confidence which decreases as we go further away
until all classes are assigned equal probabilities.
H3 (robustness): the model achieves a higher accuracy on
adversarial examples compared to a ReLU network.
It is straightforward to compare models on clean and adver-
sarial examples. To detect locality, I use a linear interpolation
between a natural image and a noise pattern. The expectation
is that a distributed model is strongly activated everywhere
along the line while a local model is only strongly activated
in the vicinity of the image. I also perform ablation analyses
to detect the benefit of each proposed trait.
3.1 Datasets
MNIST [Lecun et al., 1998] is a widely used dataset in im-
age recognition. It contains 28 × 28 gray-scale images of
hand-written Arabic digits, divided into 60,000 examples for
training and 10,000 for testing. The small scale enables fast
experimentation and therefore it is commonly used to evalu-
ate proofs of concept.
CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky, 2009] contains slightly larger
(32 × 32) color images of 10 classes of objects in natural
settings. There are 50,000 training and 10,000 testing exam-
ples. Compared to the previous dataset, CIFAR-10 is harder
in both natural and adversarial settings.
3.2 Models
For MNIST, I experimented with a simple model with two
convolutional layers (16 and 32 channels, both with 5×5 ker-
nels) and a densely connected output layer. This model and
its derivatives are trained using Adam with learning rate 0.001
for 20 epochs. Data augmentation methods used include re-
sizing, erasing, and rotating randomly, and adding Gaussian
noise (σ = 0.3).
For CIFAR-10, I used a scaled-down version of VGG ar-
chitecture [Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014] with 8 convolu-
tional layers. This choice helps to illustrate how a deeper ar-
chitecture works while being lightweight enough for quick
experimentation. All models in this line are trained using
mini-batch SGD with learning rate 0.01 for 80 epochs. For
data augmentation, I used random cropping, horizontal flip-
ping, rotation, and Gaussian noise (σ = 0.5, added after nor-
malization).
In both experiments, I start with a baseline model that uses
a ReLU architecture and is trained on only natural examples
using cross entropy loss. Modifications are added one by
one to observe the individual effect (except for elliptical units
where I also remove min-out because it becomes unnecessary
while making training unstable).
3.3 Training with Quadratic and Logarithmic
Units
The piecewise linearity of ReLU networks creates meaning-
ful gradient almost everywhere therefore enables efficient
training. In contrast, architectures with highly non-linear ele-
ments are very hard to train. I observe that vanilla implemen-
tations of logarithmic and elliptical nets tend to train poorly:
the performance oscillates around chance level early on from
the first epochs or decrease substantially midway through.
To achieve training stability, I start by training a ReLU net-
work and gradually ramp up nonlinear elements. I also find
it beneficial to detect collapse events, defined as a decrease
of training accuracy by a half in an epoch. In such cases, the
model is recovered to a checkpoint and trained for 5 more
epochs without increasing nonlinearity.
One might notice that linear functions are simply quadratic
ones with second-degree coefficients set to zero. Therefore,
to train quadratic units (Section 2.2), I replace Equation 3
with:
z = αt
m∑
i=1
w′ix
2
i + αtγ +
m∑
i=1
wixi + b, (7)
where t is training step, at ∈ [0, 1], and γ > 0. The term
αtγ is added to the net input to compensate for a possible in-
crease in negativity coming from quadratic terms. Because
gradient only flows through active neurons, gaining new ac-
tive units is a smaller concern than losing existing ones. For
a network initialized with Kaiming method, I find that γ = 1
is sufficient to stabilize learning.
Similarly, ReLog activation function (Section 2.1) is a gen-
eralization of ReLU in the sense that the former approaches
the latter when β tends to 0. Therefore, I compute the activa-
tion of a neuron as:
y = ReLog(z;α′tβ) (8)
where z is the net input and α′t grows from 0 to 1 with each
training step.
Many hyperparameters are involved in the various models.
For practical reasons, I only tried a few combinations that
make intuitive sense and select the best one with respect to
performance on natural datasets.
3.4 Attacks
The importance of evaluating against strong attacks has been
highlighted more than once in the literature [Athalye et al.,
2018; Uesato et al., 2018, for example]. I used Cleverhans,
a library of standard implementations of state-of-the-art at-
tacks. Among the algorithms offered there, I selected a bat-
tery of attacks from different categories: single-step: FGM
[Goodfellow et al., 2015]; iterative: BIM [Kurakin et al.,
2017] and C&W [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]; and gradient-
free: SPSA [Uesato et al., 2018].
For each combination of attack, model, and dataset, I eval-
uated on batches of 100 test examples, using between 15 and
100 batches depending on the speed of the attack (SPSA is
the slowest, taking more than 3 hours to finish a batch). The
accuracy on batches is used to calculate average performance
and p-value.1
4 Results
In this section, I will present the results of the proposed ex-
periments and explain how they validate my hypotheses.
4.1 Learnability and Expressiveness
The performance of my models on clean MNIST digits can be
found in Table 1. It is clear that we can reach similar levels
of performance with the proposed architecture under a con-
ventional training regime. Training with negative examples
hurts the performance, especially on CIFAR-10. A possible
explanation is a propositional theory of CIFAR-10 might be
excessively big and a more expressive form of logic might be
needed. Alternatively, a neural network might need higher
capacity to represent such a propositional theory.
The “Proposed arch.” results show that we can train a
modified architecture with elliptical units and ReLog activa-
tion function to the same or better performance compared to
ReLU networks. To confirm that filters are actually quadratic,
I examine the magnitude of quadratic weights. For an MNIST
model, the median of quadratic weights is 1.75 and 10.76
times that of linear weights for the first and the second
quadratic layers, respectively. For the CIFAR-10 model, the
corresponding figures fall between 0.33 and 1.33.
4.2 Locality
Figure 3 depicts the activation pattern of the baseline model
and the model with all logic-inspired traits enabled. I plotted
the softmax-normalized predictions of four classes that are
selected to include the highest activation for either the given
example or the noise pattern.
It is abundantly clear that, whereas the ReLU model emits
high probabilities for both true digits and noise, the proposed
1I use the function ttest ind in SciPy package with
equal var=False.
Figure 3: Comparing activation patterns of ReLU and the proposed
architecture on noisy images. Horizontal axis: level of noise, verti-
cal axis: softmax activation.
model is only activated around the test instances. Hyperpa-
rameters can argurably be tuned to make the model more ro-
bust to noise but this is beyond the scope of the paper.
To evaluate the behavior quantitatively, I obtain models’
predictions on 1,000 noise images (sampled uniformly in
[0,1] for MNIST and from N (0, 1) for CIFAR-10 because,
for the latter, pixel intensity is normalized during preprocess-
ing). Any prediction with higher than 50% confidence is la-
beled as an error. As I notice that the performance on MNIST
noise pattern shows high variance, I trained and evaluated 10
models using different random seeds.
Table 1 demonstrates the high efficiency of the proposed
models on rejecting noise for MNIST. The difference in pre-
dicted probability for real images and noise indicates that the
models are local. Comparing the performance of the pro-
posed architecture and negative training on a ReLU archi-
tecture, one can conclude that while negative training helps
improves noise rejection, the new architecture is essential to
reach high performance.
Model Real images NoiseAcc. Prob. Accuracy Probability
MNIST
Baseline 0.99 0.99 0.22± 0.15 0.64 ± 0.08
Proposed arch. 0.99 0.98 0.81± 0.35 0.35± 0.19
Neg. training 1.00 1.00 0.27 ± 0.13 0.64 ± 0.09
All mod. 0.95 0.95 0.92± 0.25 0.21± 0.16
CIFAR-10
Baseline 0.75 0.91 0.00 1.00
Proposed arch. 0.77 0.84 0.05 0.59
All mod. 0.63 0.75 0.17 0.64
Table 1: Performance on the task of classifying real images and
noise patterns. Models: Baseline = ReLU, Proposed arch. = ReLog
+ Elliptical + MaxOut + MaxFit (L1), Neg. training = BCE training
+ Negative examples, All mod. = Proposed architecture + Negative
training. Performance on MNIST noise is reported as mean ± std as
measured on 10 models trained with different random seeds.
On CIFAR-10, the new architecture increases the chance
of rejecting noise and reduce the prediction confidence com-
pared to the baseline. There is also a pronounced difference
between probabilities predicted by “Proposed arch.” on real
images and on noise patterns, suggesting that the model is
more local than a ReLU network. The negatively trained
model is better at rejecting noise at the cost of a lower ac-
curacy on true images.
4.3 Robustness on MNIST
Table 2 presents the robustness of my models against various
attacks. It is clear that the proposed architectures lead to a sig-
nificant increase in robustness across many types of threats.
Four out of six models (Row 2, 3, 5, and 6) are more robust
than the baseline on all measures. The remaining two models
beat the baseline on all but one attack.
Since all models are trained on standard back-propagation,
it is unlikely that the improvements come from gradient ob-
fuscation [Athalye et al., 2018]. There are other signs that
this is not the case: single-step attacks (variants of FGM) and
gradient-free attack (SPSA) are generally not more effective
than iterative gradient-based attacks (C&W and BIM).
One of the leading hypotheses about the origins of adver-
sarial examples states that it is the local linearity of ReLU
models that makes attacks possible [Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Warde-farley and Goodfellow, 2018]. This hypothesis is
compatible with the observation that ReLog is more robust
than ReLU against adversarial perturbation. However, it is
contradicted by the observation that elliptical units, despite
being nonlinear everywhere, do not lead to improvement on
four out of five measures when they replace min-out. It also
has difficulty in explaining why max-out only has a minor
impact on robustness while min-out increases performance
as much as five times (from 0.03 to 0.16 for BIM).
Training with independent cross entropy loss has a mixed
effect on robustness. Adversarial perturbation is an inherently
local phenomenon. The effect of activation suppression in
distant areas to the decision boundary around an example is
Figure 4: The change of output in response to a small perturbation
of input: ∆y = f(x+ ∆x)− f(x) for different functions f .
a poorly-understood area and beyond the scope of the current
paper.
4.4 Robustness on CIFAR-10
The improvement of robustness on CIFAR-10 is more modest
(see Table 3). Modified models work the best against FGM
(L∞) and C&W attacks for which they are always better than
the baseline. However, they are often only as good as the
baseline for BIM and sometimes underperform the baseline
for FGM (L2). Improvement coming from ReLog is more
consistent than other traits as the corresponding model out-
performs the baseline in two measures and maintain statisti-
cally equivalent performance on the rest.
We again observe that min-out is superior than both max-
out and elliptical units, a property cannot be explained by
the linearity hypothesis. The results of BCE training mirrors
what has been observed in MNIST experiments.
4.5 Discussions
Given the experimental results, a revision to the linearity hy-
pothesis is needed. Hoffman et al. [2019] recently showed
that, theoretically and empirically, smaller norms of the input-
output Jacobian matrix implies higher robustness. This re-
sult explains why ReLog is consistently better than ReLU
and adding elliptical units is advantageous. However, it has
difficulty in explaining min-out and max-out results because
adding them do not change the locally linear behavior of a
ReLU neural network.
To propose a unified framework that explains all obser-
vations, let us consider the input-output finite difference in-
stead: ∆y = f(x + ∆x) − f(x) where f is a neural net-
work, x ∈ Rm, y = f(x) ∈ Rn are its input and output, and
∆x ∈ Rm is a vector of a small norm: |∆x|p ≤ . Figure 4
depicts a special case where m = n = 1 or, equivalently,
where we consider only one neuron and one linear direction
in the input space.
From the graph, it can be inferred that ReLog and elliptical
units are inherently more robust than ReLU and the effect in-
creases monotonically with curvature. Min-out significantly
improves stability as long as the input lies close to the inter-
section of two hyperplanes whereas max-out can either in-
creases or decreases stability. The inferior performance of el-
liptical units compared to min-out perhaps reflects a difficulty
in training instead of an inherent property.
Model Clean FGM FGM C&W BIM SPSA
L∞ = 0.3 L2 = 2  = 0.3  = 0.3
0 Baseline 0.99 0.07 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.07
1 + ReLog (β = 2) 0.99∗ 0.30∗ 0.84∗ 0.19∗ 0.01∗ 0.37∗
2 + MaxOut (k = 4) 0.99∗ 0.42∗ 0.86∗ 0.23∗ 0.03∗ 0.44∗
3 + MinOut (k = 2) 0.99 0.66∗ 0.92∗ 0.31∗ 0.16∗ 0.52∗
4 + Elliptical (α = 1) 0.93∗ 0.58∗ 0.57∗ 0.47∗ 0.02∗ 0.22∗
5 + MaxFit (L1) 0.99∗ 0.35∗ 0.82∗ 0.19∗ 0.02 0.35∗
6 + BCE training 0.98∗ 0.56∗ 0.83∗ 0.26∗ 0.16∗ 0.42∗
7 + Negative examples 0.96∗ 0.24∗ 0.66∗ 0.12∗ 0.00∗ 0.14∗
Table 2: Accuracy of models on MNIST on different attacks. Elliptical units eliminate the need of min-out so I disable it from step 4 onward.
BIM: iterations=5, C&W: iterations=50, SPSA: iteration=50. An asterisk (∗) signifies that the result is statistically significantly different from
the previous one on the same column.
Model Clean FGM FGM C&W BIM
L∞ = 0.3 L2 = 2  = 0.3
0 Baseline 0.75 0.08 0.43 0.01 0.01
1 + ReLog (β = 1) 0.75 0.16∗ 0.45 0.03∗ 0.01
2 + MaxOut (k = 4) 0.65∗ 0.12∗ 0.31∗ 0.02∗ 0.01∗
3 + MinOut (k = 2) 0.70∗ 0.24∗ 0.37∗ 0.04∗ 0.01∗
4 + Elliptical (α = 0.5) 0.68∗ 0.12∗ 0.35 0.02∗ 0.01
5 + MaxFit (L1) 0.76∗ 0.10∗ 0.41∗ 0.02 0.00∗
6 + BCE training 0.78 0.12∗ 0.42 0.04∗ 0.01∗
7 + Negative examples 0.66 0.13 0.32∗ 0.04 0.03∗
Table 3: Accuracy of models on CIFAR-10 on different attacks. BIM: iterations=5, C&W: iterations=50. Elliptical units are applied to the
first hidden layer only. An asterisk (∗) signifies that the result is statistically significantly different from the previous one on the same column.
5 Related Work
Neural Network Design. Some elements of the architecture
proposed here were introduced before in isolation. Training
with negative examples were used in [Bromley and Denker,
1993] to encourage the rejection of “rubish class” examples.
Maxout units were designed by [Goodfellow et al., 2013] and
originally intended to replace rectified linear units instead of
working together with them. Parallel to this research, Fan
and Wang [2019] succeeded in training quadratic units. Fi-
nally, Liu et al. [2019] proposed logarithmic activation func-
tions but their formulations are slightly different from ours
and lack the smooth transition from ReLU. Different from
all the work cited above, I combine various non-conventional
design elements and show that they work together to make a
neural network more local and robust.
Adversarial Examples. Because of practical importance,
the majority of the literature is concerned with alleviating
adversarial examples. Most papers focus on improving con-
ventional architectures through regularization [Mustafa et al.,
2019] or injection of adversarial examples into training [Ku-
rakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2017]. Results that link ro-
bustness to sparseness [Guo et al., 2018] and margin [Croce et
al., 2018; Galloway et al., 2018] can be considered a special
case of the input-output Jacobian approach taken by Hoffman
et al. [2019] which is closely related to my finite difference
analysis. Taghanaki et al. [2019] show that another locality-
inducing function, the radial basis functions (RBFs), can re-
duce the success rate of attacks, as might be expected from
the analysis in the previous section.
Because experimental settings vary a lot from one paper
to another, it is often hard to compare reported results across
papers. To compare against Taghanaki et al. [2019], I have set
up attacker models to the same settings. Their RBF models
significantly outperform ones in this paper on MNIST but this
result does not affect my conclusions.
Fooling Examples. Little work has been done in this area.
A rare find is Ghosh et al. [2019] which uses an autoencoder
with a mixture of Gaussian prior to detect and reject fooling
examples.
6 Conclusions
This paper brings in ideas from fuzzy logic to improve deep
neural networks. Preliminary results show that the proposed
models are more well-behaving on noise patterns and more
robust against adversarial examples. Analyses confirm that
both the proposed architecture and training procedure con-
tribute to performance on noise patterns while the architec-
tural modifications improve robustness by enabling multiple
disconnected regions and increasing stability in each one.
Perhaps most importantly, the current paper hints at what
deep neural networks might be capable of: being both local
and deep, and combining the learnability and expressiveness
of connectionism and the validity of logic. Exciting lines of
future research can be foreseen: expanding and generalizing
the proposed architectures, improving training procedures,
improving calibration on noise patterns and other stimuli, and
studying the interaction between local and distributed repre-
sentations.
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